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CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND THE IDENTIFICATION 
OF REAL EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
Authentication or identification of real evidence 
refers to the requirement of proving that the evi-
dence is what it purports to be. McCormick wrote: 
"When real evidence is offered an adequate foun-
dation for admission will require testimony first 
that the object offered is th.e object which was in-
volved in the incident, and further that the condi-
tion of the object is substantially unchanged." C. 
McCormick, Evidence 527 (2d ed. 1972). Federal 
Evidence Rule 901 (a) codifies this requirement: 
"The requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a fin-
ding that the matter in question is what its propo-
nent claims." See also Ohio R. Evid. 901(A) (iden-
tical to Fed. R. Evid. 901 (a)). 
There are two principal methods of proving the 
identity of real evidence: first, establishing that the 
evidence is "readily identifiable," and second, 
establishing a "chain of custody." Each of these 
methods is discussed below. As a preliminary mat-
ter, however, it is necessary to define the term 
"real evidence." As used in this article that term 
describes tangible evidence that is historically 
connected with the charged offense, as distin-
guished from evidence, such as a model which is 
"'::..-- merely illustrative. See C. McCormick, E~idence 
527-28 (2d ed. 1972). For example, a murder 
weapon found at the scene is real evidence. If the 
p~ose_cution wanted to introduce the weapon at 
t~ral, rt would have to authenticate the weapon, 
e!ther by establishing a chain of custody or by pro-
vrng that it is readily identifiable. If, however, the 
~urder weapon was unavailable and the prosecu-
tron wanted to show the jury what the weapon 
looked like, a similar weapon could be used for il-
lustrative purposes. This weapon need not be 
authenticated, although the prosecution would 
have to establish that the illustrative weapon was 
substantially similar to the murder weapon in order 
to establish its probative value. Even if this condi-
tion is satisfied, the tdal court might exclude the 
exhibit if its probative value was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or 
misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
READILY IDENTIFIABLE EVIDENCE 
An item of evidence can be identified directly by 
a witness with personal knowledge who recognizes 
the item. McCormick refers to such items as "uni-
que and readily identifiable." C. McCormick, Evi-
dence 527 (2d ed. 1972). If an object is readily iden-
tifiable, there is often no need to establish a chain 
of custody. As one court has noted: "If an exhibit 
is directly identified by a witness as the object 
which is involved in the case, then that direct iden-
tification is sufficient. Such is the case with many 
objects which have special identifying characteris-
tics, such as a number or mark, or are made to 
have such identifying characteristics by special 
marks." State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 59, 
288 N.E.2d 296, 300 (1971). See a/so U.S. v. Phillips, 
640 F.2d 87, 94 (7th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. LePera, 443 F. 
2d 810, 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 
(1971) ("Counterfeit notes ... printed from a single 
plate, are unique and identifiable without proof of 
chain of custody."); U.S. v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 303 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971) ("The 
chain of custody is not relevant when a witness 
identifies the object as the actual object about 
which he has testified."). 
Federal Rule 901 recognizes this method of iden-
tification. Rule 901(b)(4), entitled, "Distinctive 
characteristics and the like," provides that 
"[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal pat-
terns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in 
conjunction with circumstances" is sufficient 
authentication of an item of evidence. See U.S. v. 
Georgalis, 631F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1980). - _ 
This method of identification is merely an ap-
plication of the first-hand knowledge and opinion 
rules--an opinion of a lay witness based on per-
sonal observation. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 and 701. 
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The witness' uncertainty in identifying the object 
affects the weigh1, not the admissibility, of the 
evidence. For example, the Ninth Circuit has writ-
ten: 
[A]Ithough the trial record reveals the identification of 
the ax made by Papse may not have been entirely free 
from doubt, the witness did state that he was "pretty 
sure" this was the weapon Johnson had used against 
him, that he saw the ax in Johnson's hand, and that 
he was personally familiar with this particular ax be-
cause he had used it in the past. Based on Papse's, 
testimony, a reasonable juror could have found that 
his ax was the weapon allegedly used in the assault. 
Papse's ability or inability to specify particular iden-
tifying features of the ax, as well as the evideoce of 
the ax's alleged changed condition, should then go to 
the question of weight to be accorded this evidence, 
which is precisely what the trial court ruled. In other 
words, although the jury remained free to reject the 
government's assertion that.this ax had been used in 
the assault, the requirements for admissibility 
specified in Rule 901(a) had been·met. U.S. v. 
Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Accord U.S. v. Drumright, 534 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976); U.S. v. 
Capocci, 433 F.2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1970); U.S. v. 
Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71, 81 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 967 (1970); Howland v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 
162, 186 N.W. 2d 319, 323 (1971) ("The witness' lack 
of certitude as to whether the objects offered are 
the ones he saw on a prior occasion goes to the 
weight the jury should give to the evidence, but 
lack of certitude does not preclude admissibility."). 
Examples 
Numerous examples of readily identifiable ob-
jects are found in the cases. First, any item im-
printed with a serial number may be identified by 
that number. Firearms often fall within this 
category, e.g., Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850, 854, 
410 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1967); People v. Soto, 35 Ill. 
App. 3d 166, 170,341 N.E.2d 107, 110 (1975); State 
v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1978), as 
does currency, e.g., Calderon v. U.S., 269 F.2d 416, 
419 (10th Cir. 1959); State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App. 
2d 54, 60, 288 N.E.2d 296, 300-01 (1971). 
Second, an object that contains the initials or 
markings of a police officer or other person may 
be readily identifiable. Examples include: 
Firearms: U.S. v. Madril, 445 F.2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 
1971), vacated, 404 U;S. 1010 (1972) (pistol); Dixon v. 
State, 243 Ind. 654, 656-57, 189 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1963) 
(shotgun). 
Bullets: Duke v. State, 257 Ala. 339, 344-45, 58 So.2d 
769 (1952); Sims v. State, 243 Ga. 83, 85, 252 S.E.2d 
501, 503 (1979). 
Currency: U.S. v. Capocci, 433 F.2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 
1970) (counterfeit bill); U.S. v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 
72-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969) (coin). 
Laboratory Slides: Gass v. U.S., 416 F.2d 767,-770 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969); Wheeler v. U.S., 211 F.2d 19, 22=23 (D.C. Cir. 
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954). 
See also O'Quinn v.- U.S., 411 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir. 
1969) (jar); People v. Horace, 186 Cal. App. 2d 560, 
562, 9 Cal. Rptr. 43, 44 (1960) (crowbar); People v. 
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Sansone, 42 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 356 N.E.2d 101, 
103 (1976) (stolen record albums); Johnson v. State, 
267 Ind. 415, 420-21, 370 N.E.2d 892, 894-95 (1977) 
(knife); State v. Coleman, 441 S.W.2d 46, 51 (Mo. 
1969) (box, watch, and bolt); State v. Ball, 1 Ohio 
App. 2d 297, 302, 204 N.E.2d 557, 560-61 (1964) 
(catheter). 
Police manuals on crime scene searches and 
evidence collection recommend this practice. See 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Handbook of 
Forensic Science 98 (rev. ed. 1979); C. O'Hara, Fun-
damentals of Criminal Investigation 70-71 (5th ed, 
1980). 
If, however, the relevance of an exhibit depends 
on its subsequent analysis, identifying it by police 
initials may be insufficient. The initials suffice to 
establish that the exhibit in court was the item 
seized by the police, but a chain of custody may 
be needed to establish that the item seized was 
the item analyzed at the crime laboratory. For ex-
ample, in Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 
588, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1947), a bottle containing a urine 
sample was initialed by the arresting officer, but 
no evidence was offered to show that the same 
bottle was the one analyzed for alcoholic content. 
Similarly, if the condition of an object, not merely 
its identity, is relevant, a chain of custody may be 
required to establish that the condition of the ob-
ject had not been altered during police custody. 
This is especially true with respect to specimens, 
such as blood samples, that are susceptible to 
contamination or deterioration. 
Third, an item of evidence may possess distinc-
tive natural characteristics which may make it 
readily identifiable. For example, in U.S. v. Briddle, 
443 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 
(1971), the prosecution introduced evidence that a 
button top found at the scene of a burglary came 
from the defendant's coat. The police officer 
described the button as follows: "It had a picture 
of a whale on the front of it. It was leather .... And 
it had a sticky substance on the back, as though it 
might have been stuck to something .... [l]t was a 
dark brown in color. Had a whale or fish on it. The 
tail was up in the air. Split. And I believe it was the 
left eye of the animal that was up.P /d. at 448. The 
Eighth Circuit held this identification sufficient: 
"Given the uniqueness of the buttons on Briddle's 
coat, we think this identification evidence 
est(l.blished that [the] exhibit ... was the button 
top found at the scene of the burglary." /d. at 449. 
Thus, the issue is whether the distinctive char-
acteristics are sufficient to make it unlikely th,qt 
another object would have the same characteris-
tics. See also U.S. v. Reed, 392 F.2d 865, 867 '(7th 
Cir.) ("very unusual looking hat"), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 984 (1968); Reyes v. U.S., 383 F.2d 734, 734 (9th 
Cir. 1967) (hold-up note "was unique and readily 
identifiable"); Pinkey v. U.S., 363 F.2d 696, 698 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (knife identified by eyewitnesses 
after providing accurate description); Jenkins v. 
U.S., 361 F.2d 615, 619 n.6 (10th Cir. 1966) (coin of 
unusual thickness). 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
A chain of custody is required if an object is not 
readily identifiable or its relevance depends on its 
condition or subsequent analysis. 
@ Length of the Chain of Custody 
Several issues have arisen concerning the 
"length" of the chain of custody, that is, when it 
commences and when it ends. The Indiana courts 
have taken the position that the chain of custody 
does not commence until government agents take 
possession of the object: "The chain-of-custody 
foundation is not required ... for periods before 
the evidence comes into the possession of law en-
forcement personnel." Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 
265, 269-70, 379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978). This rule is 
based on the theory that "the State cannot be 
charged with the responsibility of accounting for 
the custody of the exhibit" when it is not in their 
possession, Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 629, 283 
N.E.2d 540, 543 (1972), and has been applied in two 
different types of cases. The first type involves 
cases in which a third party had possession of the 
item prior to the time it was turned over to the 
police. Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 629-30, 283 N.E. 
2d 540, 543 (1972); Love v. State, 383 N.E.2d 382, 
384 (Ind. App. 1978). The second type involves 
cases in which the item was not discovered at the 
crime scene until sometime after the commission 
of the crime. Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 265, 269-70, 
379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978) (three-hour delay); Thorn-
ton v. State, 268 Ind. 456, 459-60, 376 N.E.2d 492, l 494 (1978). 1 
The Indiana position misconceives the purpose 
of the chain of custody requirement. The rule is 
not designed to hold the police accountable, but 
rather, to insure the relevancy of the evidence. See 
Bean v. U.S., 533 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D. Colo. 1980) 
("The general purpose of requiring a chain of 
.custody to be established is to insure that the evi-
dence being offered is what the proponent claims 
it to be."). If the relevance of the object depends 
... on its use in a crime, the offering party must 
establish, through a chain of custody or otherwise, 
a connection between that object and the crime. 
For example, in U.S. v. White, 569 F.2d 263 (5th 
. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978), the court 
noted: "This is not a routine chain of custody situ-
ation in which the chain is broken between seizure 
of the evidence from the accused and a subse-
quent trial. Rather, the alleged break occurred 
before the government came into possession of 
the heroin." /d. at 266. After citing the rule in the 
"typical chain of custody cases," the court wrote: 
. "We apply the same rule in the instant case." /d. 
There is also disagreement over the point at 
which the chain of custody ends. Some cases 
seem to suggest that the prosecution must ac-
count for the evidence from the time of seizure to 
the time of trial. Annat., 21 A.L.R. 2d 1216, 1236 
(1952). There is some support for this view in the 
· Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 901, 
where the drafters refer to "establishing narcotics 
as taken from an accused and accounting for 
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custody through the period until trial, including 
laboratory analysis." 56 F.R.D. 183, 333 (1973). 
The "length" of the chain of custody depends 
on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. 
This point is illustrated by State v. Conley, 32 Ohio 
App. 2d 54, 288 N.E.2d 296 (1971}, which involved a 
prosecution for the illegal sale of LSD. The drugs 
were purchased with marked bills whose serial 
numbers had been recorded. The defendant object-
ed to both the admissibility of the bills and the 
LSD. The court wrote: 
To identify a particular item ... as being part of a per-
tinent incident in the past usually requires the show-
ing of a continuous chain of custodians up to the 
material moment. When a chemical analysis is involv-
ed ... the material moment is the moment of 
analysis, since this provides the basis for the expert 
testimony and makes that testimony relevant to the 
case. In the case of many other items, the material 
moment occurs at the trial. /d. at 59-60. 
The court went on to hold that the chain of 
custody for the marked bills ran from the time the 
bills were marked until the trial, at which time they 
were identified. The chain of custody for the drugs 
differed; it ran from the time of seizure to the time 
of analysis. This approach is correct. The loss or 
destruction of the drugs after the time of analysis 
would not affect the relevancy of the expert's testi-
mony concerning the nature of the drugs. See U.S. 
v. Sears, 248 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1957) ("[B]ut 
even if the exhibit had been lost, the undisputed 
testimony is that the product seized was analyzed 
by the chemist who found it to be heroin."); U.S. v. 
Singer, 43 F. Supp. 863, 864 (E.p. N.Y. 1942) ("[T]he 
mere fact that the sample was lost or destroyed, 
after analysis, does not prevent proof of such an-
alysis, evidence having been offered to identify the 
sample analyzed .... "). Moreover, the prosecution 
is generally not required to introduce real evidence 
in order to prove its case. See Chandler v. U.S., 318 
F.2d 356, 357 (10th Cir. 1963) (whiskey bottles); 
Ware v. U.S., 259 F.2d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1958) 
(heroin); Foster v. U.S., 212 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 
1954) (stolen property). The so-called "best 
evidence" rule applies only to writings, recordings, 
and photographs. See C. McCormick, Evidence 560 
(2d ed. 1972); Fed. R. Evid. 1002. 
In a recent case, however, the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled "that when a defendant is charged 
with possession of a controlled substance, that 
substance, if available, must be introduced into 
evidence .... " G.E.G. v. State, 417 So.2d 975, 977 
(Fla. 1982). In support of this rule, the court wrote: 
An absolute rule that a substance may be introduced 
or not at the discretion of the prosecutor is practically 
undesirable because of its potential for abuse. For ex-
ample, such prosecutorial discretion could deliberate-
ly or unwittingly be used to confuse defense counsel 
and thwart the ability to make certain objections, 
particularly objections to chain of custody .... 
The state's failure to introduce the substance in 
evidence against the defendant might put the defen-
dant in the awkward position of introducing it himself 
should he wish to challenge its authenticity where 
'! 
there has been testimony of its existence as here. /d. 
at 977-78. 
Neither of these reasons seems compelling. 
First, the trial court has the authority to require the 
introduction of real evidence if necessary to avoid 
jury confusion. Thus, it seems questionable 
whether a blanket rule, in lieu of the present dis-
cretionary rule, is required. Second, the principal 
problem in G.E.G. was that the exhibit was marked 
for identification and referred to at trial without be-
ing formally offered or admitted in evidence. 
Again, it may be doubted whether a blanket rule is 
necessary to remedy this problem, especially in a 
bench trial as was the case in G.E.G. Third, the 
reasons supporting the Florida rule--the potential 
for prosecutorial abuse and the awkward position 
for objecting defense counsel--would seem to 
apply to all real evidence, not only to controlled 
substances. Nevertheless, the Florida rule should 
not impose any significant burdens on the pro-
secution. The court recognized an exception for 
cases in which the evidence is unavailable, and 
most prosecutors would introduce the drugs in any 
event for tactical reasons. 
Far more important than the Florida rule is the 
development of case law recognizing a 
defendant's constitutional right to retest evidence 
and the concomitant obligation of the prosecution 
to preserve the evidence for retesting. For exam-
ple, in People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 
(Colo. 1980), the Colorado Supreme Court upheld 
the suppression of evidence relating to the defen-
dant's severed fingertip, which was found at the 
scene of a homicide. The court ruled that the 
police's failure to preserve the evidence for reex-
aminationoviolated the due process guarantee. See 
also State v. Hannah, 120 Ariz. 1, 2, 583 P.2d 888, 
889 (1978k People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App. 3d 454, 
457-58, 369 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1977). Thus, although 
the relevancy of real evidence is not affected by its 
loss or destruction after laboratory analysis, the 
recognition of a constitutional right to retest 
evidence provides a strong incentive for the 
government to preserve and account for real 
evidence until the time of trial. 
Links in the Chain of Custody 
The links in the chain of custody are those per-
sons who had physical custody of the object. Per-
sons who had access to, but not possession of, 
the object generally need not be accounted for. As 
one court has observed: "There is no rule requiring 
the prosecution to produce as witnesses all per-
sons who were in a position to come into contact 
with the article sought to be introduced in 
evidence." Gallego v. U.S., 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th 
Cir. 1960). Accord U.S. v. Fletcher, 487 F.2d 22, 23 
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974) (the 
fact that "fifteen persons had access to the 
evidence room" went to weight, not admissibility); 
Reyes v. U.S., 383 F.2d 734, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) 
("[T]he Government was under no obligation to pro-
duce as witnesses all persons who may have 
handled exhibit 1."). 
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Failure to account for the evidence while in the 
custody of a person with possession may con-
stitute a fatal break in the chain of custody. See 
U.S. v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) ("There is no 
evidence as to where or from whom Lieutenant 
Remkus got the keys."). Some courts have in-
dicated that all persons who had possession of an 
exhibit must testify. People v. Connelly, 35 N.Y.2d 
171, 174, 316 N.E.2d 706, 708, 359 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 
(1974) ("[A]dmissibility generally requires that all 
those who have handled the item 'identify it and 
testify to its custody and unchanged condition.' "). 
Other courts have adopted a more flexible ap-
proach: "[P]recision in developing the 'chain of 
custody' is not an iron-clad requirement, and the 
fact of a 'missing link does not prevent the admis-
sion of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient 
proof that the evidence is what it purports to be 
... .' " U.S. v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th 
Cir. 1982). For example, in one case the chief 
chemist, who had received a sealed envelope of 
heroin and had turned it over to the examining 
chemist, did not testify. Nevertheless, the court 
upheld the admissibility of the evidence because 
the seal was "unbroken when the latter received 
it." U.S. v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 216 n.1 (1st Cir. 
1972). Accord U.S. v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 
1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971), on rehearing, 471 F.2d 
1082, rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In 
short, "accounting for" all of the links in the chain 
of custody does not necessarily mean that all the 
custodians must testify at trial. 
CONDITION OF EVIDENCE 
Frequently, the condition of an object is as im-
portant as its identity. Thus, courts have held that 
"[b]efore a physical object connected with the 
commission of a crime may properly be admitted 
in evidence there must be a showing that such ob-
ject is in substantially the same condition as when 
the crime was committed." Gallego v. U.S., 276 F. 
2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord U.S. v. McKin-
ney, 631 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Aviles, 
623 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1980). 
Determining what changes are "substantial" 
depends upon how the changes affect the rele-
vance of the evidence. "Even though the object is 
not in exactly the same condition at trial as at the 
time in issue--or even if in substantially the same 
condition--the exhibit may still be admitted if the 
changes can be explained, and they do not destroy 
the evidentiary value of the object.'' Comment, 
Preconditions for Admission of Demonstrative 
Evidence, 61 Nw.U.L. Rev. 472, 484 (1966). For ex-
ample, in one case counterfeit bills introduced at 
trial had apparently changed color due to tests for 
fingerprints. This change, however, did not affect 
admissibility. "[N]o change in color could destroy 
the relevance of the bills to show their counterfeit 
character from the identity of serial numbers, and 
their competence as evidence for this purpose is 
unimpaired by the unexcluded possibility of a 
change in color." U.S. v. Skelley, 501 F.2d 447, 451 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974). See 
also David~on v. State, 208 Ga. 834,· 836, 69 S.E.2d 
757, 759 (1952) (victim's clothing admissible even 
1iJ though washed). 
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
The burden of proving the chain of custody rests 
with the party offering the evidence. U.S. v. San-
tiago, 534 F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 197_6). Prior to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Ev1de~ce, t~e 
courts described the standard of proof 1n vanous 
ways. The most common expression for the _stan-
dard was that the offering party must establish 
identity and condition by a "reasonable probabili-
ty." E.g., U.S. v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th 
Cir. 1973) ("reasonable probability the article has 
not been changed in any important respect"); U.S. 
v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1971), on 
rehearing, 471 F.2d 1082, rev'd on other grounds, 
414 U.S. 218 (1973); U.S. v. Capocci, 433 F. 2d 155, 
157 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1970); Gass v. U.S., 416 F. 2d 767, 
770 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Other standards included: 
State v. Baines, 394 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Mo. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 992 (1966) ("reasonable 
assurance"); Raskey v. Hulewicz, 185 Neb. 608, 
615-16, 177 N.W.2d 744, 749 (1970) (authenticity 
must be established "unequivocally"). 
The "reasonable probability" standard would ap-
pear to be the equivalent of the preponderance of 
evidence (more probable than not) standard, and 
h some courts stated the standard in those terms. 
· See State v. Henderson, 337 So.2d 204, 206 (La. 
1976); State v. Sears, 298 So.2d 814, 821 (La. 1974). 
The cases also indicated that the trial court deter-
mined whether this standard had been satisfied. 
See U. S. v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 
1973); U.S. v. Daughtry, 502 F.2d 1019, 1021-23 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
In contrast, Federal Rule 901 (a) requires that the 
offering party introduce "evidenc~ suffici~nt ~o 
support a finding that the matter 1n quest1on IS 
what its proponent claims." Thus, the trial court 
does not decide finally or exclusively whether the 
item has been identified; rather, the court decides 
only whether sufficient evidence has been in-
troduced from which a reasonable jury could find 
the evidence identified. In other words, the offering 
party need only make a "prima facie" showing of 
authenticity to gain admissibility and the jury 
decides ultimately whether the evidence has been 
sufficiently identified. See U.S. v. Goichman, 547 F. 
2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[l]t is the jury who will 
ultimately determine the authenticity of the 
evidence, not the court."). 
Whether this treatment of the issue of authen-
ticity was intended to effect a major change in the 
chain of custody requirement remains unclear. 
Several Fifth Circuit cases contain broad language 
that would support such a change. In one case, 
the court wrote: "[C]hain of custody goes to the. 
Weight rather than the admissibility of the 
evidence, and is thus reserved for the jury." Ballou 
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v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 
1981); accord U.S. v. Colatriano, 624 F.2d 686, 689 
(5th Cir. 1980). In the same case, however, the 
court recognized that the trial court decides the 
threshold requirement of whether there exists a 
"reasonable probability" that the condition of the 
object has not been changed. Ballou v. Henri 
Studios, Inc., 656 F. 2d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981); 
U.S. v. Albert, 595 F. 2d 283, 290 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). Moreover, other 
federal courts of appeal appear to apply the pre-
Rule's "reasonable probability" standard. See U.S. 
v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1034, (1981); U.S. v. Weeks, 645 F.2d 658, 
660 (8th Cir. 1981); U. S. v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 
802 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Fungible Objects 
As a practical matter, most courts probably app-
ly a stricter standard when the nature of the 
evidence is "fungible." As one court has com-
mented: "The danger of tampering, loss, or 
mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest 
where the exhibit is small and is one which has 
physical characteristics fungible i~. nature and . 
similar in form to substances fam1l1ar to people 1n 
their daily lives." Graham v. State, 253 Ind. 525, 
531, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1970). See also U.S. v. 
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) ("There was never any 
significant risk, as there would be with a fungible 
piece of real evidence, such as blood samples, 
that the tape recordings were inadvertently ex-
changed with other evidence of a similar type."); 
U.S. v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810, 812-13 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971) ("Narcotic drugs are 
fungible and, being such, evidence of a continuous 
chain of possession is often necessary .... "); 
Brewer v. U.S., 353 F.2d 260, 261 (8th Cir. 1965) 
("Marijuana is fungible. There is no intrinsic way 
that one can identify a specimen observed yester-
day with the one presented today."). 
The Presumption of Regularity 
In satisfying its burden of proof, the prosecution 
is often aided by the "presumption of regularity." 
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the 
trial judge was entitled to assume that this offi_cial 
would not tamper with the sack and can or the1r con-
tents. Where no evidence indicating otherwise is pro-
duced, the presumption of regularity supports the of-
ficial acts of public officers, and courts presume that 
they have properly discharged their official duties. 
Gallego v. U.S., 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). 
Accord U.S. v. Aviles, 623 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1980); U.S. v. Nelson, 603 F.2d 42, 48 (8th Cir. 1979). 
The presumption of regularity, however, has 
been criticized. 
The presumption of regularity, if it can be dignified as 
a rule does not serve as a substitute for evidence 
when 'authenticity is, as here, challenged on not in-
substantial grounds. At best it may relieve the govern-
ment of the necessity for offering proof of custody un-
til the integrity of the evidence has been put in issue. 
U.S. v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). 
See also U.S. v. Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 
1980) ("The Government's burden ... cannot be 
diluted by unwarranted presumptions about the 
evidence It seeks to introduce."). 
PROOF OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
Applicability of Rules of Evidence 
Before discussing the methods of proving a 
chain of custody, the issue of determining whether 
the rules of evidence apply to such proof must be 
addressed. Federal Rule 104(a) provides that in 
deciding preliminary questions of admissibility, the 
trial court "is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges." Accord-
ingly, if the admissibility decision is entrusted ex-
clusively to the trial court, evidence rules would 
not be applicable and hearsay could be used to 
establish a chain of custody. See also U.S. v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1974) ("[T]he rules of 
evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do 
not operate with full force at hearings before the 
judge to determine the admissibility of evidence.") 
Rule 104(b), which governs questions of condi-
tional relevancy, is an exception to Rule 104(a). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 
901 clearly indicates that Rule 104(b) governs the 
authenticity issue: "This requirement of showing 
authenticity or identity falls in the category of 
relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact and is governed by the procedures set 
forth in Rule 104(b)." 56 F.R.D. 183, 333 (1975). 
Because Rule 104(b) controls, the rules of evidence 
apply inasmuch as the jury must share in the 
authenticity decision. 
[W]hile the court's power to "consider" inadmissible 
evidence under Rule 104(a) is clear, the substantive 
determination which the court is required to make on 
the issue of authentication is whether admissible 
evidence exists which is sufficient to support a jury 
finding of authenticity .... [O]ur task in ruling on 
authenticity is limited to determining whether there is 
substantial admissible evidence to support a finding 
of authentication by the trier of fact. Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 
1190, 1220(E.D. Pa.1980). 
Methods of Proof 
Typically, the chain of custody is established, at 
least in part, by the testimony of the persons who 
had possession of the exhibit. These witnesses 
may refresh their memories by referring to any 
available documentation. See Fed. R. Evid. 612. 
The prosecution may also introduce evidence of 
habit or routine practice to establish the chain of 
custody; that is, the practice of police departments 
and laboratory personnel in securing and preserv-
ing physical evidence. Federal Rule 406 provides 
that "[e]vidence of the habit of a person or of the 
routine practice of an organization ... is relevant 
to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in con· 
formity with the habit or routine practice." 
In some cases the chain of custody has been es-
tablished by documentary evidence. The principal 
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obstacle to this method of proof is the hearsay 
rule, although several hearsay exceptions may be 
applicable. For example, courts have held that 
laboratory slides and labels on specimen bottles 
fall within the Federal Business Records Act 
because they had been prepared by hospital per-
sonnel in the regular course of business. U.S. v. 
Duhart, 496 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974); Gass v. U.S., 416 F.2d 
767, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
These cases, however, predated the adoption o1 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule 
803(8)(B), which governs the public records excep-
tion, specifically excludes "in criminal cases mat· 
ters observed by police officers.and other law en-
forcement personnel." According to the legislativ« 
history, "the reason for this exclusion is that. 
observations by police officers at the scene of thE 
crime or the apprehension of the defendant are n< 
as reliable as observations by public officials in 
other cases because of the adversarial nature of 
the confrontation between the police and the 
defendant in criminal cases." S. Rep. No. 1277, 9~ 
Gong., 2d Sess. (1974). Moreover, a number of 
courts have held that evidence inadmissible unde 
the public records exception may not be admittec 
under the business records exception, Rule 803(6) 
See U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 84 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Thus, Rule 803(8)(B)'s prohibition against the u~ 
of police records presents an important obstacle 
to the use of documentary evidence in establishir 
the chain of custody. This issue, however, is not 
settled. In U.S. v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), the defendant contended that police report 
are never admissible on behalf of the prosecutior 
and thus DEA forms of chemical analysis and loc 
sealed envelopes containing notations of the dat1 
and location of the sale of heroin were inadmis-
sible. The court rejected this argument, holding 
that the documents were not unreliable on the 
grounds that they were prepared for the purpose 
litigation. Although the court recognized that the 
forms had "certain indicia of 'police reports,' " it 
found that the forms and lock-sealed envelopes 
contained "only skeletal ·information, and are 
prepared not solely with an eye towards presenta 
tion, but towards preserving a record of the chair 
of custody." /d. at 912. 
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